Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States. HarperCollins. ISBN 9780062097729. [20] [21] Michael Lind (born April 23, 1962) is an American writer and academic. He has explained and defended the tradition of American democratic nationalism in a number of books, beginning with The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution (1995). He is currently a professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution. Free Press. ISBN 9780029191033. [32] [33]

The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and The American Way of Life. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198042143. [22] [23]Vietnam: The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict. Free Press. ISBN 9780684842547. [28] [29] ML: There are two working classes, divided by geography and to some degree by origin, in the US and many western European countries. In the expensive hub cities, there is a large Most economic growth and scientific and cultural progress in history are the result of genetic endowments of superior individuals, families, and races. In The Washington Post in 2014, George Will, a former communitarian conservative who is now a libertarian, wrote: “Judicial activism isn’t a bad thing”: “Conservatism’s task, politically hazardous but constitutionally essential, is to urge courts to throw as many flags as there are infractions,” by striking down great numbers of municipal, state, and federal laws that run afoul of the tenets of free-market fundamentalism. The reason is that the nation-state combines the scale of premodern multinational monarchies with the civic patriotism of the republican city-state. A sense of common identity is important, because modern governments and economies are complex and rely on a high level of public legitimacy to function.

Lind is an outspoken critic of libertarianism. He had observed that of the 195 countries in the world today, none is fully a libertarian society: T he editors have been kind enough to give me space to respond to Michael Lind’s reply to my article on the us Constitution in nlr 232. footnote 1 Since 2016, many American intellectuals have thought more expansively than before about the possibilities in the party system. Donald Trump’s populist campaign against his party Establishment thrilled some, and terrified others, with the possibility of smashing the old Reaganite creed. Bernie Sanders’s two unsuccessful campaigns inspired similar dreams of a new class-based politics. Meanwhile, new social movements dedicated to eradicating racism and sexism, propelled by the first nonwhite male president, drew energy from Trump’s overt bigotry and misogyny.Institutions that used to magnify the power of working-class people – trades unions, local political parties and religious congregations – have all dissolved for different reasons. By default, power has siphoned upwards in the culture, politics and the economy,” he says. What Lincoln Believed: The Values and Convictions of America's Greatest President. Doubleday. ISBN 9780385507394. [24] Eugenic ideology was used to justify quotas limiting Jewish and nonwhite immigration to the United States in the 1920s. It was also invoked in support of the compulsory sterilization by state governments of more than 60,000 Americans. Later, the same ideology legitimated the genocide of millions of Jews and Romani people by Hitler’s Germany. Discredited after World War II by association with Nazi racial-hygiene theories, ideas about superior and inferior races, and explanations of social phenomena in terms of heredity, disappeared from academic thought and public discourse and survived only on the outer fringes of the right. The New Class War: Saving Democracy From The Managerial Elite. Penguin Random House. ISBN 9780593083697. [17] Between an oligarchy in technocratic form and outsider populism, Lind predicts that oligarchs with money and connections will win nine times out of 10. But as they turn narrow and nepotistic, the ruling class will further lose their connection to reality.

Rather than criticize actual policies, Lind describes his target as so sweeping it cannot be named or defined. The “Quota Project,” he warns darkly, is “the radical restructuring of the U.S. and other Western societies on the basis of racial quotas, so that all racial and ethnic groups are represented in equal proportions in all occupations, classes, academic curriculums, and even literary and artistic canons.” You can understand how Lind might be accurately characterizing the beliefs of some people. But who is actually carrying out this agenda? And where? If there is a single major institution anywhere in American society that has come close to proportional representation, I haven’t heard of it. To the extent it’s possible to tell what he’s even talking about here, Lind seems to be hyperbolically characterizing the circa-2020 push to slightly ramp up the same affirmative-action policies that have existed for decades — and even that push is petering out. In line with much left-wing thinking, Lind takes aim at these powerful managerial elites, arguing that more than thirty years of technocratic neoliberal revolution have created the conditions for a populist revolt. However, this hasn’t given rise to Karl Marx’s “class struggle” between the industrial proletariat and capitalist class . Instead, Lind describes a ruthless Hobbesian war of all against all, taking place in spheres of culture, economy, and politics, in which the working class has little to no agency. This provides some of the main insights of his book — but also an inability to wrestle with the new political realities of our time. Pointing Out Liberal HypocrisyEven after World War II, significant political subcultures in the United States ignored the cult of the Founding Fathers. Squabbling Marxist sectarians identified with Lenin or Trotsky or Bukharin or Luxemburg or Kautsky, not Madison or Hamilton or Jefferson. Libertarians had little use for either Jefferson’s agrarianism or Hamilton’s developmentalism and neomercantilism, and found their prophets in modern émigrés from Russia (Ayn Rand) or Austria (Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek), not the early American republic. This is absurd. There just can’t be many white police abolitionists who came to that position after thinking, “You know, my surest route to a cushy government job would be to march in support of radical criminal justice policies that have little hope of near-term passage, but which would, in theory, free up fiscal space for investment in social services.” The Radical Center: The Future of American Politics (with Ted Halstead). Doubleday. ISBN 9780385500456. [26] [27]

Just as some individuals are genetically superior to others within a race, so some races are genetically superior to other races. Although the quote is actually from Kant, it is taken out of context and used in a way that is closer to the classic Burkean critique of rationalist restructuring and reform. footnote 7 Rationalism is unrealistic, this view holds, because it tries to impose abstract notions of what should be on a reality that is both richer and messier than anything ‘petulant, assuming, short-sighted coxcombs of philosophy’ can come up with. In its desire to make a clean sweep of things, it can only wind up doing violence to that which it purports to help. Real reform, by contrast, must come from within. It must develop organically out of the society of which it is a part.In our two-party system, consistent progressives can be part of an electoral majority only if at least half of their Democratic coalition is less progressive. What a winning coalition would look like depends on which issues unite the progressives and non-progressives. There are only two choices. The Democrats can be an economically liberal party, with socially liberal and socially conservative wings, or they can be a socially liberal party, with economically liberal and economically conservative wings.